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Abstract: What is wrong with government whistleblowing and when can it be justified? 
In my view, “government whistleblowing,” that is, the unauthorized acquisition and dis-
closure of classified information about the state or government, is a form of “political 
vigilantism,” which involves transgressing the boundaries around state secrets, for the 
purpose of challenging the allocation or use of power. It may nonetheless be justified 
when it is suitably constrained and exposes some information that the public ought to 
know and deliberate about. Government whistleblowing should then be viewed, along the 
lines of civil disobedience, as a collective cognition- and legitimacy-enhancing device. 
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If the twentieth century was the age of civil disobedience, the twenty-first 
century is shaping up to be the age of whistleblowing. Whistleblowers 
have dominated the news and social media in the past year. Bradley (now 
Chelsea) Manning, who leaked over 750,000 classified documents to 
WikiLeaks, was recently sentenced to 35 years in prison. The Department 
of Justice is seeking to prosecute WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange under the 
1917 Espionage Act for publishing the secret documents leaked by Man-
ning. Edward Snowden found temporary asylum in Russia after he blew 
the whistle on the National Security Agency’s massive domestic and inter-
national surveillance program. For some people, Manning and Snowden 
acted heroically. For state representatives and White House officials, Man-
ning’s and Snowden’s actions were “un-American” and “treasonous.”  
 The public opinion appears ambivalent, both skeptical that Manning 
and Snowden are traitors and reluctant to call them heroes.1 Many news 
                                                 
 1On the public opinion’s divided view of Edward Snowden, see the following Rea-
son-Rupe poll from September 2013: http://reason.com/poll/2013/09/19/poll-finds-
public-split-on-whether-edwa2; and a YouGov/Huffington Post survey conducted in 
March 2014: https://today.yougov.com/news/2014/03/28/poll-results-snowden/. On the 
public view of Manning, see, e.g., this June 2013 Rasmussen Reports national survey: 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/june_2013/52
_view_wikileaks_suspect_bradley_manning_as_a_traitor. These polls suggest that public 
ambivalence is more pronounced with respect to Snowden than it is toward Manning. 
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articles’ headlines reflect this hesitation: “Traitor or Hero?” Ambivalence 
seems warranted: on the one hand, there are good reasons for condemn-
ing those who seize unlawfully and seek to disseminate national security 
information; on the other hand, leaks often play an important role in ex-
posing serious government wrongdoing and informing the public debate, 
as the Pentagon Papers did in their times. This paper sketches an ethics 
of government whistleblowing that sheds light on both its prima facie 
wrongfulness and the conditions under which it may be justified (i.e., 
shown to be permissible). 
 “Government whistleblowing,” as I shall understand it, involves the 
unauthorized acquisition (typically through mishandling or theft of pro-
tected documents) and disclosure (typically through leaks to a news out-
let) of classified information about the state or government. To the extent 
that government whistleblowing, in my definition, involves the unau-
thorized disclosure of classified information about the state or govern-
ment, it is illegal. Government whistleblowing is also by definition ex-
ternal, that is, outside approved organizational channels, whereas internal 
whistleblowing is conducted within the organization. The whistleblower 
may be an insider, that is, someone with current or former privileged ac-
cess to the organization’s data or information, or an outsider without 
privileged access. Manning, as an intelligence army analyst in Iraq, and 
Snowden, as a former CIA employee and NSA contractor, were insiders 
to the organization they denounced. Outsiders include, but are not limited 
to, journalists (such as The Nation’s Jeremy Scahill, who blew the whis-
tle on the rise of military contracting firms in the U.S.2), public intellec-
tuals (think of Emile Zola’s “J’Accuse!”), and activists (e.g., Russian 
anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny).  
 The definition I just proposed does not attempt to precisely track our 
usage of the phrase “government whistleblowing,” which we usually also 
apply to lawful revelations, such as Detective Frank Serpico’s whistle-
blowing on the New York Police Department’s widespread corruption. 
Serpico ultimately earned the praise of the City of New York and the 
federal government. For my purposes, what matters is that government 
whistleblowing is external and illegal, whereas “public whistleblowing,” 
as I shall call lawful revelations about the state or government (or city), 
is typically internal and legally protected (at least when whistleblowers 
get things right).3 Government whistleblowing is also distinct from cor-
porate whistleblowing, which involves disclosing information about a 
                                                 
 2See Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary 
Army (New York: Perseus Books, 2007).  
 3The reality is much more complex than the distinction drawn here suggests. I return 
to this below.  
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corporation’s alleged misconduct, as Erin Brokovich did when she ex-
posed Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s toxic dumping in California. 
While ethicists have extensively discussed corporate and public whistle-
blowing, they have paid little attention to government whistleblowing in 
my sense.4 Yet blowing the whistle about government wrongdoing, to the 
extent that it involves stealing and leaking classified information about 
the state or government to outside sources, requires (at least presump-
tively) special justification.  
 Authorities’ prohibition of government whistleblowing has particular 
weight in democratic societies, where obeying the law is a matter of re-
specting democratically enacted decisions. In nondemocratic or other-
wise illegitimate states, on the other hand, government whistleblowing 
does not seem to be in special need of justification, though it clearly rais-
es serious prudential dilemmas. The fact that criticizing the Soviet re-
gime was illegal, for instance, did not make it presumptively wrong. As 
he alerted the world to the Gulag, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s dissent did 
not require special justification simply in virtue of being illegal. So my 
goal here is to justify government whistleblowing in less-than-perfect but 
basically democratic societies like those in North America and Western 
Europe. Though the argument I will develop in this paper is tailored for 
the United States context, and purports to evaluate the actions of gov-
ernment whistleblowers like Manning and Snowden, it sketches an ethics 
that can be applied to other basically liberal and democratic states.  
 The discussion proceeds as follows. First, I define whistleblowing in 
general (section 1.a) and distinguish government whistleblowing from oth-
er kinds of whistleblowing (1.b). Second, I examine four candidate ac-
counts of the wrongfulness of government whistleblowing: namely, that it 
involves an impermissible breach of professional and promissory obliga-
tions (2.a), that it is unpatriotic (2.b), harmful (2.c), and amounts to vigi-
lantism (2.d). The first, second, and third rationales fail to explain the 
wrongfulness of government whistleblowing, let alone support the claim 
that government whistleblowing can never be morally justified. I offer my 
own account of the wrongfulness of government whistleblowing in the 
fourth section on vigilantism: neither ordinary vigilantism (2.d.i) nor the 
kind of vigilantism at play in treason and espionage (2.d.ii), I argue, cap-
tures what is prima facie wrong with government whistleblowing, but a 
third kind of vigilantism does: “political vigilantism,” as I call it, consists 
in transgressing the boundaries around state secrets, for the purpose of 
challenging the allocation or use of power (2.d.iii).  
 I turn to the justification of government whistleblowing, thus con-
                                                 
 4One exception is Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation 
(New York: Random House, 1983). 
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ceived as a form of political vigilantism, in section 3. I argue that gov-
ernment whistleblowing may be justified even in democratic states when 
it meets three conditions: one, the state conceals from the public serious 
government wrongdoing or programs and policies that ought to be 
known and deliberated about (3.a); two, lawful attempts to make the in-
formation public are attempted first, unless they would be useless (3.b); 
and three, the whistleblower takes serious precautions so as to minimize 
the harms that could potentially ensue from the disclosure (3.c). In sec-
tion 4, I suggest we think of government whistleblowing along the lines 
of civil disobedience, as a collective cognition- and legitimacy-enhancing 
device; and I consider a series of objections to my account centered on 
the notion that government whistleblowing is not civil. 
 
 
1. 
 
1.a. Whistleblowing 
 
Whistleblowing in general consists in the intentional disclosure of infor-
mation about an agent or entity’s suspected illegal or unethical conduct. 
In his seminal analysis of whistleblowing, Peter Jubb identifies six main 
elements in whistleblowing:  
 
(1) an act of disclosure (intentional release of information),  
(2) an actor (a person with current or former privileged access to an or-
ganization’s data or information),  
(3) a disclosure subject (information about some wrongdoing that is de-
liberately kept from some people),  
(4) a target (an organization),  
(5) a disclosure recipient (an external entity having potential to remedy 
the wrong), and  
(6) an outcome, namely, the disclosure’s entry into the public domain.5  
 
 In Jubb’s view, the specific difference between whistleblowing and 
other kinds of denunciation, such as informing and providing tips, lies in 
the stand that whistleblowers take when they make the information pub-
lic: their disclosure amounts to an indictment of the wrongdoing.6 From 
this perspective, the whistleblower has more in common with the dissi-
dent, who opposes a perceived injustice, than with the informer, who 
trades an accusation for some personal benefit, such as a shorter sen-
                                                 
 5Peter B. Jubb, “Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation,” Jour-
nal of Business Ethics 21 (1999): 77-94, pp. 83-88.  
 6Ibid., p. 79.  
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tence. In this vein, Sissela Bok conceives of whistleblowing as a form of 
dissent (rather than denunciation) that includes an accusation.7  
 I shall not assume that the specific difference between whistleblowing 
and other kinds of denunciation is the indictment or accusation found in 
the former, because it appears that accusation can be salient at least in 
some cases of informing (Jorge Luis Borges’s “Unworthy,” for instance, 
tells the story of a man driven by his civic-mindedness to inform the po-
lice on a burglary that he is about to commit with other gangsters8). I 
agree, in any case, that dissent is a critical attribute of whistleblowing.  
 
1.b. Government whistleblowing  
 
Here are three examples of whistleblowers. First, a corporate whistle-
blower: Bradley C. Birkenfeld, who was a wealth manager at Crédit 
Suisse, disclosed information about the bank’s fraudulent financial activ-
ities, including money laundering, accounting fraud, and violations of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, thereby leading to a successful enforce-
ment action by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Second, a public whis-
tleblower: Sergeant Joseph Darby, former U.S. Army Reservist, provided 
information to the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command about 
the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse scandal. Third, a government whistle-
blower: Daniel Ellsberg leaked the Pentagon Papers to The New York 
Times, thereby alerting the public to the U.S. war crimes in Vietnam and 
lying and deception at home. What differentiates corporate, public, and 
government whistleblowing?  
 To use Jubb’s categories, I believe neither the actor, nor the subject, 
nor the target, nor the outcome of the disclosure helps differentiate be-
tween different kinds of whistleblowing. The whistleblower in each case 
is someone with privileged access to critical information; the subject is 
some suspected misconduct, that is, illegal or unethical activity; both 
public and government whistleblowing target the government or a state 
agency; and the intended outcome of all three kinds of whistleblowing, 
broadly conceived, is the entry of the information into the public domain. 
The main difference seems to lie in the act and recipient of whistleblow-
ing. First, whereas corporate and public whistleblowers often act within 
the law by going through the proper channels of appeals, government 
whistleblowers, in my understanding, end up committing crimes by steal-
                                                 
 7Bok, Secrets, p. 214. 
 8Jorge Luis Borges, “Unworthy” (“El indigno”), originally published in Brodie’s 
Report, August 1970. For more on the morality of informing, see Candice Delmas, “The 
Civic Duty to Report Crime and Corruption,” The Ethics Forum/Les Ateliers de l’éthique 
9 (2014): 50-64. 
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ing and leaking classified information, even when they started by follow-
ing protocol. Second, instead of reporting the information to the authori-
ties, as corporate and public whistleblowers usually do, government 
whistleblowers transmit the information to the public (directly or indi-
rectly via a news outlet). 
 In theory at least, public and corporate whistleblowing are viewed as 
crucial instruments of law enforcement in the private and public sectors. 
Thus as he took office in 2009, President Barack Obama praised whistle-
blowers, whom he described as “often the best source of information 
about waste, fraud, and abuse in government.”9 In the U.S., a robust ap-
paratus of federal and state law shields whistleblowers from employers’ 
retaliation. The Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912, for instance, guarantees 
the right of federal employees to furnish information to the U.S. Con-
gress and protects them from wrongful dismissal. The Military Whistle-
blower Protection Act secures the right of members of the armed services 
to communicate with any member of Congress. The False Claims Act 
and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
provide not only protections but also financial incentives to corporate 
whistleblowers by rewarding them with a share of the money they help 
the government save. Birkenfeld, for instance, was awarded $104 million 
for blowing the whistle on Crédit Suisse. 
 However, such laws remain very limited in their scope (i.e., who is 
covered and how much is protected). Thus the 1989 Federal Whistleblow-
er Protection Act, which shields government employees who reveal fraud 
and other wrongdoing from penalties and employer retaliation, does not 
protect NSA, FBI, and CIA workers or contractors. Neither does the 2012 
Federal Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA), which ex-
pands the definition of “protected disclosure” and permits whistleblowers 
to collect compensatory damages, but excludes intelligence employees. 
Similarly, the most recent National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 
which offers military contract employees some whistleblower protec-
tions, excludes intelligence workers—both federal employees and con-
tractors—from coverage under the act. While federal employees working 
in intelligence have scant whistleblower protections, compared with oth-
er federal workers, employees of federal contractors have no protections 
for whistleblowing under any of the laws and recent reforms.10  
 Add to this patchwork of limited protections the state’s relative dis-
                                                 
 9See http://change.gov/agenda/ethics_agenda/.  
 10See, e.g., Mike Elk, “Snowden Leak Highlights Few Whistleblower Protections for 
Intelligence Contract Employees,” In These Times, 11 June 2013, http://inthesetimes. 
com/working/entry/15130/snowden_leak_highlights_fewer_whistleblower_protections_ 
for_federal_contrac. 
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cretion in enforcing these protections, so that it is difficult, in practice, to 
predict exactly when the law will be used to protect a given whistleblow-
er, or instead to penalize her. All in all, the apparent distinction between 
public (internal and lawful) whistleblowing and government (external 
and unlawful) whistleblowing does not map well onto the phenomena. 
Public and corporate whistleblowers, frustrated by unresponsive head-
quarters or authorities, may decide to expose the misconduct to the pub-
lic; and they will not necessarily be prosecuted for it. For instance, Peter 
Buxtun, employee of the United States Public Health Service, leaked 
information on the Tuskegee syphilis experiment to the Washington Star, 
after filing two official protests with the Service’s Division of Venereal 
Diseases. He was not sued for going public. Conversely, public whistle-
blowers who only go through the proper channels and are supposed to be 
legally protected, may be retaliated against and even treated as criminals 
by the state. Four NSA whistleblowers before Snowden, who had pur-
sued internal, lawful means of alert only, were harassed by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and one of them, Thomas Drake, was 
prosecuted by the Department of Justice.11  
 Why are some whistleblowers praised and protected, but not others? 
The problem with government whistleblowing lies in part in the sensitive 
nature of the information that is disclosed to the public. By leaking classi-
fied information and bypassing the authorities, government whistleblowers 
seem to disregard the law and defy the state’s authority. If whistleblow-
ing is a form of dissent, as Bok argues, then government whistleblowing 
in particular may be deemed “subversive” or “transgressive” dissent. Far 
from being instruments of law enforcement, government whistleblowers 
are often treated as enemies of the state.  
 
 
2. 
 
In this section, I examine four possible accounts of the wrongfulness of 
government whistleblowing, all of which might be taken to ground a cat-
egorical prohibition: first, government whistleblowing involves a breach 
of moral and professional duty (2.a); second, it betrays disloyalty to the 
state (2.b); third, it is harmful to particular individuals, national security, 
and public trust (2.c); and fourth, it amounts to vigilantism (2.d). As I 
shall show, each rationale fails to support the claim that government 
whistleblowing can never be morally justified; and all but the last one 
fail to explain what is prima facie wrong with it. The harm-based argu-
ment, however, successfully highlights the necessity of minimizing the 
                                                 
 11I discuss the “NSA Four,” as they came to be known, in more detail in section 3.b. 
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harms that could potentially ensue from the disclosure—which is the se-
cond condition for justifiable government whistleblowing laid out below 
in 3.b. The fourth rationale is the most compelling; but neither ordinary 
vigilantism (2.d.i) nor the kind of vigilantism at play in treason and espi-
onage (2.d.ii) capture what is prima facie wrong with government whis-
tleblowing. I contend that government whistleblowing consists of a dif-
ferent kind of vigilantism—“political vigilantism”—that involves violat-
ing the moral duty to respect the boundaries around state secrets, for the 
purpose of challenging the allocation or use of power (2.d.iii).  
  
2.a. Breach of moral obligations 
 
Before working in certain government and state offices, employees and 
contractors have to pass security clearance. They often take an oath not to 
disclose classified information, which grounds a pro tanto moral duty to 
keep secret information secret, since, one might argue, we are morally 
bound by the promises we made freely. Snowden did not in fact swear an 
oath to secrecy—he swore an oath to protect and defend the Constitution. 
But one might still reasonably say that government employees and con-
tractors like Snowden have a professional duty not to disclose classified 
information to third parties.12 Confidentiality is indeed expected of occu-
pants of certain government offices, as part of their job. On most accounts 
of professional ethics, the demands of an office generally impose genuine 
moral demands on agents so long as the institution to which the office is 
attached has itself some value.13 Hence, cleared government employees 
typically have a moral (promissory and/or professional) obligation of con-
fidentiality and are prohibited from disclosing classified information. This 
is the gist of the first argument against government whistleblowing. 
 Note the difference between insiders and outsiders: while Ellsberg, 
Manning, and Snowden were (supposed to be) morally bound not to dis-
close confidential information, The New York Times’ Anthony Russo, 
who published the Pentagon Papers, Assange, and The Guardian’s Glenn 
Greenwald, who published the Snowden leaks, were under no such duty. 
Indeed, the latter arguably discharged their professional responsibility as 
journalists by publishing the information; and they were protected by the 
freedom of the press.14 In contrast, the law did not protect, and profes-
                                                 
 12Note that I shall use “duty” and “obligation” interchangeably. 
 13See, e.g.: Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (New York: 
Routledge, 1957); Mike W. Martin, Meaningful Work: Rethinking Professional Ethics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Daniel Wueste, “Taking Role Moralities Seri-
ously,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (1991): 407-17; and Michael Hardimon, 
“Role Obligations,” Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994): 333-63. 
 14There is debate over the question whether WikiLeaks should count as a news outlet, 
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sional ethics did not appear not to justify, Ellsberg’s, Manning’s, and 
Snowden’s leaks of classified information.  
 But are government employees morally bound not to disclose confi-
dential information simply in virtue of having taken an oath, or occupy-
ing a certain office? I shall shortly examine the latter question concern-
ing professional obligations, but I now want to address the question of 
the moral force of promises. Are we indeed morally bound by the prom-
ises we made freely, irrespective of the content of these promises? An 
affirmative answer would be implausible. Kimberley Brownlee has re-
cently rebutted the voluntarist assumption that “promise-keeping has a 
general moral application that trumps other kinds of moral duty even 
when the conduct promised entails the performance of deeply objection-
able acts.”15 Christopher Moltisanti is not morally bound to kill rival ca-
pos just because he promised Tony Soprano he would do so. Neither is 
Christopher morally bound to keep silent if he promises not to tell any-
one that Tony killed Salvatore “Big Pussy” Bonpensiero. Because the 
moral weight of promises depends at least in part on their content, prom-
issory obligations don’t trump other moral obligations. 
 Nevertheless, let us assume that the obligation of secrecy really pro-
vides government employees with a sufficient, ordinarily conclusive rea-
son (a pro tanto duty) not to disclose confidential information. The ques-
tion is whether the existence of this pro tanto duty entails that disclosure 
of classified information can never be justified. The answer is “no.” David 
Cole recently observed that “[e]ven the most ardent security proponent 
must concede that the benefits from revealing illegal abuses of authority 
will sometimes outweigh the costs of disclosing those secrets.”16 Though 
the duty to keep secrets weighs very heavily on the balance of reasons, 
other considerations, such as the duty to report government abuse, or the 
prospect of benefiting public deliberation, may sometimes outweigh it. 
Disclosure may then be justified.  
 A champion of secrecy will reply that the professional and moral duty 
not to disclose is such that it prevents the agent from engaging in any 
                                                                                                             
and Assange as a journalist, and whether he is entitled to the strong legal protections 
associated with freedom of the press. See, e.g.: Jonathan Peters, “WikiLeaks Would Not 
Qualify to Claim Federal Reporter’s Privilege in Any Form,” Federal Communications 
Law Journal 63 (2011): 667-96; Geoffrey R. Stone, “WikiLeaks, the Proposed SHIELD 
Act, and the First Amendment,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy 5 (2011): 
105-18; Mary-Rose Papandrea, “The Publication of Classified Information in the Digital 
Age,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy 5 (2011): 119-30. 
 15Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 112. 
 16David Cole, “The Three Leakers and What to Do About Them,” The New York 
Review of Books, 6 February 2014. 
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balancing of reasons at all. On this view, the duty supplies not only a 
first-order reason for action, but a second-order reason to disregard rea-
sons against it. Joseph Raz calls duties of this sort “exclusionary.”17 The 
paradigmatic exclusionary duty, for Raz, is the duty to obey the law. As 
he explains, the existence of a legal rule purports to preempt the individ-
ual’s assessment of the merits of the action legally required. The duty of 
secrecy also appears exclusionary in nature.  
 Some philosophers hold that role-occupants’ failure to conform to the 
formal duties attached to their role (e.g., as judge or soldier) threatens 
valuable institutions (the judiciary or the army) by undermining confi-
dence in their functioning.18 Indeed, one might insist that the duties that 
flow from a given role are justified—and the exclusionary claim success-
ful—just in case the institution served by the role is itself valuable. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to fully critique this view, but I want to 
suggest that when professional duties conflict with other moral consider-
ations, it is an open question how these conflicts should be resolved.  
 Contra the view just mentioned, Brownlee shows that “there is an 
ineliminable conceptual and evaluative gap between the formal 
codifiable dictates of normatively legitimate offices and positions and the 
broadly non-codifiable moral responsibilities of the moral roles that un-
derpin and legitimate those positions” (she calls this the “gap thesis”).19 
The existence of this gap is unavoidable given the “rigidifying and gen-
eralizing nature of formal institutions,” that is, the fact that they neces-
sarily issue formal dictates that ignore context-sensitive ways of satisfy-
ing the responsibilities at the heart of a certain role. Because the gap is 
unavoidable, it translates into frequent conflicts between the responsibili-
ties that underlie one’s role and the office’s formal dictates. In cases of 
conflicts, Brownlee argues, “it is morally obligatory ceteris paribus to 
depart from formal expectations and to adhere to our moral responsibili-
ties” (she calls this the “moral roles thesis”).20  
 Albeit very brief, this summary of Brownlee’s arguments outlines a 
methodic defense of the view that office-holders’ general moral respon-
sibilities should take precedence over their professional dictates and 
promissory obligations when the two come into conflict. While I have 
not provided any reasons to endorse Brownlee’s gap thesis and moral 
roles thesis, historical evidence regarding the dangers of unquestioning 
                                                 
 17Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 3-36. 
 18See, e.g.: David Estlund, “On Following Orders in an Unjust Law,” Journal of Po-
litical Philosophy 15 (2007): 213-34; Hardimon, “Role Obligations”; Joel Feinberg, 
Problems at the Roots of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
 19Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction, p. 86. 
 20Ibid., p. 87. 
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adherence to formal roles suggests skepticism toward the opposing view. 
At the very least, one should allow for the possibility that breach of the 
duty not to disclose may sometimes be justified.  
 
2.b. Patriotic disloyalty 
 
Another potential problem with government whistleblowing is that it in-
volves betrayal of one’s country or state (I want to retain the ambiguity 
of the two terms, “country” and “state,” for now). At least in the United 
States, government whistleblowers are often accused of, and sometimes 
also charged with, treason and espionage, which convey disloyalty. Trea-
son presupposes a preexisting duty of allegiance or loyalty based on po-
litical membership (and hence only applies to citizens).21 This duty is 
both a moral duty and a legal duty, explicitly recognized, for instance, in 
the Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United States of America.  
 From this perspective, what is wrong with government whistleblow-
ing, one might contend, is that it involves betrayal of, or intent to betray, 
the state—in short, patriotic disloyalty. Although I am not aware of any 
account of patriotic disloyalty, philosophers have offered myriad ac-
counts of patriotic loyalty. Stephen Nathanson, for instance, characteriz-
es patriotism by four qualities: “Special affection for one’s country, a 
special identification with it, special concern for its well-being, and a 
willingness to sacrifice to promote the country’s good.”22 Disloyalty, 
presumably, involves not only lack of such feelings and dispositions to-
ward one’s country, but also negative feelings and dispositions toward it.  
 Does government whistleblowing involve patriotic disloyalty, thus 
broadly conceived? A reasonable answer is that it depends on the whis-
tleblower. President Obama denied that Snowden was a patriot. Nathan-
son observed, on the contrary, that “Mr. Snowden has certainly made a 
significant personal sacrifice, and there is so far no evidence that he was 
motivated by anything other than concern for his country.”23 Snowden 
indeed explicitly denied his intention to betray the U.S.: “I did not seek 
to enrich myself. I did not seek to sell U.S. secrets. I did not partner with 
any foreign government to guarantee my safety.”24 Instead, he affirmed 
                                                 
 21See, e.g.: Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1984); Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1993); and Bas van der Vossen, “Associative Political Obligations,” Philoso-
phy Compass 6 (2011): 477-87. 
 22Stephen Nathanson, Patriotism, Morality, and Peace (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1993), p. 134. 
 23Stephen Nathanson, “Letter to the Editor,” New York Times, 10 August 2013; 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/opinion/obamas-defense-of-surveillance.html. 
 24Statement by Edward Snowden to human rights groups at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo 
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his intention to protect the Constitution of the United States. Snowden, 
Manning, and Ellsberg have been hailed by some as “true patriots.” 
There is no reason to think that patriots must abide by the law and would 
never condemn their country.25 
 Part of what may ground the difference between Obama’s and 
Nathanson’s verdict is that Obama appears to equate patriotism with “al-
legiance to the state,” that is, respect for and compliance with the system 
of institutions and laws, whereas Nathanson focuses on the agent’s atti-
tude toward her country, understood to comprise a certain historical, so-
cial, and political community. Nathanson’s account fits better with our 
ordinary conception of patriotic (dis)loyalty as lying in the agent’s inten-
tions and motivations first. His account further allows for the possibility 
that agents might break the law out of patriotism, whereas Obama’s un-
derstanding makes it impossible by definition.  
 Nathanson stresses that “[w]hether Mr. Snowden is a patriot and 
whether he acted rightly are two different questions,” adding: “[m]any 
patriotic people have carried out or supported actions that have been 
harmful to their country.”26 We identify patriotism or disloyalty by 
searching the agent’s motives; we evaluate the rightness or wrongness of 
the action by examining its consequences. And so, knowing that some-
one acted out of loyalty or out of disloyalty does not settle the question 
whether one’s action was justified.  
 One may object that there is an asymmetry between patriotic and un-
patriotic motives: although patriotic motives are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to justify an action, patriotic disloyalty is sufficient to show an 
action is impermissible. This is mistaken, however. For one, people may 
do the very same thing out of patriotic or unpatriotic intentions (such as 
voice dissent against the War in Afghanistan), and it would seem wrong 
to condemn one but not the other act on the basis of the agent’s motives. 
Patriotic disloyalty may further be an appropriate response to a country’s 
repressive history, as many Germans argued after World War II, so that a 
decision to emigrate or refuse to sing the national anthem, for example, 
would be perfectly permissible. 
 What should concern us is whether the agent’s disloyalty led her to 
attempt to injure the state—in a context where the state is legitimate and 
ought to be preserved. So, the wrong-making feature of the action does 
not lie in the agent’s unpatriotic motivations, but in its potentially harm-
ful effects. 
                                                                                                             
airport, 12 July 2013; http://wikileaks.org/Statement-by-Edward-Snowden-to.html. 
 25See, e.g., Simon Keller’s discussion of “patriotic dissidents” in “Patriotism as Bad 
Faith,” Ethics 115 (2005): 563-92, pp. 573-74. 
 26Nathanson, “Letter to the Editor.” 
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2.c. Harm  
 
There are three ways of cashing out the harm-based argument against 
government whistleblowing: government whistleblowers (i) threaten the 
safety of particular individuals, (ii) endanger national security, and (iii) 
damage public trust.  
 
2.c.i. Particular individuals’ safety. Divulging the identity of agents in 
covert operations immediately puts their life under threat of death; and 
disclosing top-secret information about ongoing and upcoming military 
operations endangers troops’ safety. I shall not dispute this point, but 
simply note that it does not warrant wholesale condemnation of govern-
ment whistleblowing, since the information released can be—and ought 
to be—carefully edited, as I will argue in section 3. 
 
2.c.ii. National security. Under U.S. law, and in many other countries, 
the crime of treason carries a possible death sentence. The rationale for 
this is that although the traitor may not have killed anyone (the usual jus-
tification for the death penalty), his or her actions endanger the safety of 
particular people as well as the whole community, and are in some sense 
morally comparable to killing. U.S. espionage law reflects the damage 
done to the state, as it applies to “[w]hoever knowingly and willfully 
communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to an 
unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to 
the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign 
government to the detriment of the United States any classified infor-
mation.”27 This may indeed be the most oft-heard—and seemingly com-
pelling—reason for categorically condemning government whistleblow-
ing: leaks of classified information endanger national security.  
 The government’s national-security argument against whistleblowing 
goes something like this. Just as individuals need control over their pri-
vate information in order to protect their autonomy (such as their rela-
tionships and plans in the making), so the government claims a funda-
mental interest in concealing, and having exclusive control over, certain 
information for the sake of effective governance. Protecting national se-
curity (including cybersecurity) is the main function for which govern-
ments claim they need secrecy.28   
 The state’s interest in concealing certain information, such as details 
about secret military operations, is widely accepted. I shall accept it, too, 
                                                 
 2718 USC § 798 (my emphasis).  
 28They also evoke the need for secrecy in other realms, such as with respect to inter-
national negotiations. See Bok, Secrets, pp. 181-87. 
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and not just for the sake of argument: I do not find WikiLeaks’ or the 
hacktivist group Anonymous’ crusade for absolute transparency (if I 
understand correctly what they are after) particularly compelling. But the 
difficulty is to determine the legitimate scope of state secrecy. The gov-
ernment asks the public to trust it when it comes to delineating that 
scope, on the grounds that an open debate about what should and should 
not be kept hidden from the public would itself endanger national securi-
ty. Bok cites a U.S. official arguing that publishing “examples, reasons, 
and assorted details” regarding the government’s strategy in the Cold 
War “would certainly damage the nation’s interests.”29  
 Recent examples concerning the alleged, but in fact merely apparent, 
dangers of transparency in the context of the war on terror abound. Until 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Combatant Status Review Tribunals estab-
lished by the Department of Defense for persons held in Guantánamo 
Bay did not permit defendants and their lawyers to see or rebut the evi-
dence on the basis of which they were tried and convicted—allegedly for 
the sake of protecting national security.30 Yet compliance with minimal 
due process guarantees in the trials of Guantánamo detainees since 2006 
has not endangered national security. For another example, the govern-
ment refuses to divulge the criteria used to decide who gets on terrorist 
watch lists such as the Terrorist Screening Database and the no-fly list. 
Although the lists generate many false positives, since anyone who 
shares the name of someone on the list will be treated as a suspect, in-
cluding children, it is nearly impossible to legally challenge the designa-
tion. Legal scholars have argued that these practices are unlawful, unduly 
restrictive, and unethical; and the state has not explained why legal chal-
lenges would threaten national security.31  
 As these examples illustrate and history demonstrates, the govern-
ment makes claims concerning the necessity to operate behind closed 
doors to protect national security much more often than necessary, and in 
a way that often constitutes abuse of power. The point of the political 
system of checks and balances is to check these claims, and halt these 
abuses by the executive. But the system is fallible, to say the least. 
 It is an open question how much and to what extent state secrets are 
necessary for success in war and counterterrorism, and whether their dis-
closure automatically damages the nation’s interests. Though the gov-
ernment affirmed that the release of the Pentagon Papers endangered the 
troops in Vietnam and threatened national safety, no empirical evidence 
                                                 
 29Ibid., pp. 202-3. 
 30Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 548 US 557 (2006). 
 31See, e.g., Anya Bernstein, “The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists,” Buffalo 
Law Review 61 (2013): 461-535. 
 The Ethics of Government Whistleblowing 91 
 
 
  
came to validate these fears. U.S. officials’ claims that China and Russia 
would seize the Snowden leaks have not been confirmed either. Man-
ning’s leaks of diplomatic cables certainly embarrassed the government, 
but they do not appear to have injured the United States. In light of the 
state’s tendency to abuse its exclusive control over secrecy, the harm-
based argument does not warrant categorically prohibiting leaks of clas-
sified information.  
 
2.c.iii. Public trust. Here is another standard by which to judge the poten-
tial harms of government whistleblowing, besides the threat to personal 
safety and national security: decline of public trust. Henry Kissinger ar-
gued that the purpose of “those who stole” the Pentagon Papers was to 
“undermine confidence in their government” and “raise doubts about our 
reliability in the minds of other governments, friend and foe, and indeed 
about the stability of our political system.”32 Officials argue that gov-
ernment whistleblowers weaken trust in government and public servants.  
 I think this is correct. The Watergate scandal, the Pentagon Papers, 
and the Snowden leaks, to take just a few examples, certainly damaged 
public trust in the government. The question is whether it is right to de-
plore decline of trust in institutions that fail to deserve trust. Insofar as 
trust is not good in and of itself, but ought to be cognitively grounded, 
that is, based on reasons, its decline should not be lamented. Trustwor-
thiness is what matters.33 Trusting an incompetent, corrupt, or malevolent 
government to serve the public good is not desirable; indeed citizens may 
have a prima facie obligation to undermine untrustworthy governments. 
From this perspective, not only does leaks’ potential damage to public 
trust not warrant categorical prohibition, but government whistleblowing 
can serve a valuable function—enhancing institutions’ trustworthiness by 
pointing out their failures.  
 This is not to say that any and all shortcoming of public offices 
should always be exposed to the public, especially if the information’s 
entry into the public domain can be expected to have toxic effects more 
serious than the wrongdoing that was exposed. Distrust has been ob-
served to “spill over” from agent to agency and from one agency to an-
other in the political context.34 One should keep this phenomenology of 
                                                 
 32Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1979), p. 
730; cited in Bok, Secrets, p. 207.  
 33See, e.g.: Onora O’Neill, A Question of Trust: The BBC Reith Lectures 2002 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Mark E. Warren (ed.), Democracy and Trust 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Russell Hardin, Trust (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2006).  
 34See Gabriella R. Montinola, “Corruption, Distrust, and the Deterioration of the Rule 
of Law,” in Russell Hardin (ed.), Distrust (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 
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distrust in mind when seeking to expose institutional shortcomings. In 
his discussion of the moral force of law in Summa Theologica, Aquinas 
argues that subjects faced with unjust laws that are “contrary to the hu-
man good” (which do not bind in conscience) must cautiously and 
thoughtfully weigh the expected costs and benefits of disobedience 
against those brought about by compliance with the law.35 The conclu-
sion of deliberation may be that one should obey the law, if disobedience 
would cause “scandal or disruption,” in Aquinas’s words; or that one 
ought to disobey, if leaving the law unchallenged would be worse.  
 The same may be said about exposing certain official and institutional 
wrongs: one should carefully compare the consequences of disclosure 
against those of inaction. Some official wrongs, such as war crimes, may 
be said to be so grave as to necessitate public exposure no matter what 
ensues. Others, such as public officials’ extramarital affairs, do not de-
serve the same level of exposure (if any). Thus I shall stand by my posi-
tion that trustworthiness is what matters, but also stress the importance of 
weighing the benefits of disclosure against its possible toxic effects when 
deliberating about whether to blow the whistle on some state secret. In 
short, the subject and manner of leaking matter a lot, as I shall further 
explain in sections 3.a and 3.c. 
 
2.d. Vigilantism 
 
2.d.i. Crime-fighting vigilantism. What is wrong with government whis-
tleblowing, one might argue, is that it amounts to an impermissible form 
of vigilantism that undermines the rule of law. According to John Locke, 
people surrender the two powers they have in the state of nature upon 
entering the civil society, namely, the “natural right to do whatsoever 
[one] thinks fit for the preservation of [oneself] and others within the 
permission of the law of nature,” and the “natural right to punish and be 
the executor of the law of nature.”36 Through the social contract, they 
transfer these two powers or rights to the sovereign, and thereby consti-
tute political authority. On this picture, vigilantes do wrong because they 
retain one or both of these rights, and thus violate the social contract.  
 Neighborhood watches and superheroes usually come to mind when 
we think of vigilantism. Following Travis Dumsday, let us understand 
                                                                                                             
2004), pp. 298-323. 
 35Unfair tax laws and laws that originate ultra vires belong to this category. Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica (New York: Cosimo, 2007), Q. 96, art. 4. For discussion of 
Aquinas’s position, see Norman Kretzmann, “Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex: Laws on Trial in 
Aquinas’ Court of Conscience,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence 33 (1988): 99-122. 
 36John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. C.B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1980 [1690]), § 128. 
 The Ethics of Government Whistleblowing 93 
 
 
  
ordinary crime-fighting vigilantism as “the organized use of violence or 
threat of violence by an agent or agents who are not willingly accounta-
ble to the state, for the purpose of controlling (preventing and/or punish-
ing) criminal or noncriminal but still deviant actions.”37 Vigilantes use or 
threaten violence to fight crime; and they do so independently, and in 
contravention, of the state. They wrongfully hold on to the “natural right 
to punish and be the executor of the law of nature” and usurp law-
enforcement functions, especially police powers.38 Something at least 
vaguely like this may be going on with government whistleblowing; but 
examination of another kind of vigilantism, recently conceptualized by 
Youngjae Lee, gets us closer to the mark.  
 
2.d.ii. Foreign relations vigilantism. Lee proposes to understand treason 
and espionage as “foreign relations vigilantism.”39 What is wrong with 
these crimes, he submits, “is that they cross the boundaries that are set up 
to protect the state monopoly of violence.”40 The state claims a legitimate 
monopoly on the use of coercive force, as a necessary condition for order 
and self-protection. This monopoly on violence, according to Lee, is the 
central feature of the configuration or allocation of power between the 
state and its citizens. Because their compliance with this configuration is 
required for the state’s ability to fulfill its mission, citizens have a moral 
duty to respect the state’s allocation of power.  
 “When a citizen participates in efforts to undermine the core institu-
tional resources the state requires to protect itself” (such as police, mili-
tary forces, and intelligence agencies), Lee explains, “the citizen disturbs 
the way in which power is distributed within the polity and enters a do-
main of exclusive governmental power … [T]he relevant wrong here 
should be thought of as usurpation of state power.”41 Traitors and spies 
transgress this configuration by directly or indirectly attempting to un-
dermine “core institutional resources the state requires to protect itself ... 
or to otherwise advance its interests by force.”42 Foreign relations vigi-
lantism, on Lee’s view, is prima facie wrong insofar as it involves a 
breach of the moral duty to respect the allocation of state power.  
                                                 
 37Travis Dumsday, “On Cheering Charles Bronson: The Ethics of Vigilantism,” The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2009): 49-67, p. 58. 
 38This isn’t Dumsday’s view of what is wrong with vigilantism. On his account, vigi-
lantism is prima facie wrong insofar as it violates citizens’ moral duty to obey the law. 
Dumsday, “On Cheering Charles Bronson,” p. 59. 
 39Youngjae Lee, “Punishing Disloyalty? Treason, Espionage, and the Transgression 
of Political Boundaries,” Law and Philosophy 31 (2012): 299-342, p. 304. 
 40Ibid., p. 335. 
 41Ibid., p. 336. 
 42Ibid., p. 306. 
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 The prosecution of government whistleblowers as traitors and spies 
seems to suggest that they might be engaged in exactly the kind of trans-
gression of the boundaries of state power that Lee describes. However, 
further reflection on the nature and aims of government whistleblowing 
indicates that the transgression in question is of a very different kind. In 
particular, it is inaccurate and unhelpful to describe government whistle-
blowers’ transgression as an arrogation of power (which characterizes 
both crime-fighting and foreign relations vigilantes) or as aiming to in-
jure the state (the essence of foreign relations vigilantism). 
 
2.d.iii. Political vigilantism. My suggestion is that the vigilantism at the 
heart of whistleblowing consists in transgression of the boundaries 
around state secrets, for the purpose of challenging the allocation or use 
of power. I propose to call this “political vigilantism.” The crucial differ-
ence between traitors and whistleblowers is that while the former attempt 
to undermine core institutional resources, the latter purport to challenge 
the allocation or use of state power, that is, the ends for which, and man-
ner in which, the state’s institutional resources are deployed, including 
the state’s determination of the proper scope of secrecy. In short, politi-
cal vigilantes aim to expose to the public, and thus question the legitima-
cy of, the boundaries around state secrets that they cross.  
 This understanding of government whistleblowing as a form of vigi-
lantism provides a persuasive rationale for its wrongfulness. It can further 
account for the concerns underlying the two previous accounts, which 
were centered on disloyalty (2.b) and harm (2.c): the loyalty flouted by 
government whistleblowers is that which demands respecting the state’s 
configuration of power; and the harm of government whistleblowing con-
sists in disturbing that configuration. The wrong of political vigilantism 
(and of other forms of vigilantism) thus lies in its breach of the moral duty 
to respect the allocation of power. Yet showing that government whistle-
blowing amounts to political vigilantism is not sufficient to ground its 
categorical condemnation. Both Dumsday and Lee argue that the particu-
lar brand of vigilantism they are interested in can sometimes be justified. 
In the next section, I shall show the same about political vigilantism. 
 
 
3. 
 
What must be true of the state before it generates a duty to respect its 
allocation of power? Although all states, good and bad, claim the need to 
unilaterally determine and control the allocation of power, there cannot 
be a moral duty to abide by tyrannical states’ configuration of power. 
Indeed there is a moral right, perhaps even a duty, to interfere with a  
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tyrannical allocation of power. Presumably, only subjects of legitimate 
(de jure, not simply de facto) states have a duty to respect the state’s 
boundaries of power. If legitimacy is a matter of degree, as one may 
plausibly argue, democratic societies should have the strongest claim to 
generating a duty to respect the state’s allocation of power, since this 
allocation has been determined collectively, in a way that reflects con-
cern for all citizens. In turn, nondemocratic and authoritarian states 
would only have a weak claim, if any, to imposing on their subjects a 
duty to respect the boundaries of state power. In such states, political 
vigilantism may not be prima facie wrong (or, to put it differently, the 
duty to respect the allocation of power would be easily defeated).  
 Take Chinese dissident and artist Ai Weiwei, who has blown the 
whistle on his government’s inertia in the wake of the 2008 Sichuan 
earthquake. The government having failed to record the casualties, 
Weiwei compiled and published on his blog the list of children killed. 
His tallying of the tragedy’s deaths, and documentation of the govern-
ment’s failure to react in a timely and appropriate manner, disrupted the 
allocation of state power, insofar as counting the dead and taking care of 
the injured and sick in times of emergency are among the state’s basic 
functions (think of the state’s control of the plague-stricken city in 
Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish). Weiwei’s activism constitutes 
an interference with the state’s allocation of power; and it was treated as 
such: he was brutally assaulted by the police shortly afterwards and rec-
orded the incident and his convalescence.43 His activism clearly qualifies 
as political vigilantism, that is, transgression of the boundaries of power, 
carried out to contest the state’s failure to react to the earthquake. Though 
very dangerous in the Chinese context, it does not appear presumptively 
wrong, given (or assuming) China’s serious legitimacy deficits. 
 In contrast, there is a strong case against interfering with the configura-
tion of power in democratic states, where people collectively determine the 
allocation of power. Political vigilantism would then wrongfully contra-
vene the people’s will or democratic sovereignty. Moreover, in democratic 
states governed by the rule of law, part of the configuration of power in-
volves an institutionalized system of checks and balances designed to pre-
vent executive abuse of power and oversee the ends for which, and man-
ner in which, the state’s institutional resources are deployed, including 
the government’s determination of the proper scope of secrecy. And so, 
in crossing the boundaries of state power, government whistleblowers 
appear to usurp legitimate state powers and flout democratic authority.  
 Although the duty to respect the allocation of state power is the weight-
                                                 
 43See Ai Weiwei: Never Sorry, documentary film directed by Alison Klayman (2012).  
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iest in deliberative democracies, it is not absolute, but may sometimes be 
outweighed. Government whistleblowing may then be justified. Hence 
the first condition for the justification of government whistleblowing: 
 
(A) The subject condition: The moral duty to respect the allocation of 
state power is overridden—and government whistleblowing may be 
justified—when the state conceals from the public serious govern-
ment wrongdoing or programs and policies that ought to be known 
and deliberated about.  
 
The preceding discussion of the prima facie wrongfulness of whistle-
blowing further suggests the following two conditions for the justifica-
tion of government whistleblowing: 
 
(B) The act condition: The act (i.e., unlawful acquisition and disclosure 
of secret information) should generally be undertaken after lawful 
attempts to make the information public have been attempted, un-
less there are reasons to think these would be useless; and 
 
(C) The minimize harms condition: The whistleblower should take seri-
ous precautions in the disclosure so as to minimize the harms that 
could potentially ensue, including carefully choosing the leaks’ re-
cipients and editing the information. 
 
When government whistleblowing satisfies these three conditions, it may 
be a morally justified (i.e., at least permissible, if not also obligatory) 
interference with the state’s allocation of power.44 My claim, however, is 
not that the subject condition, the act condition, and the minimize harms 
condition are necessary and sufficient for the justification of government 
whistleblowing. They should instead be viewed as ceteris paribus con-
straints on justifiable government whistleblowing. 
 
3.a. The subject condition 
 
First, the moral duty to respect the boundaries or allocation of state power, 
though ordinarily conclusive in democratic states, may sometimes be over-
ridden. The duty may be weakened or defeated by significant “informa-
tional deficits,” as I shall refer to them, that arise when the public is kept 
in ignorance of serious government wrongdoing (such as its commission 
of human rights abuses) or programs and policies that ought to be known 
and collectively debated (such as domestic surveillance). This first condi-
                                                 
 44I focus here on the permissibility of government whistleblowing. For a discussion 
of its obligatoriness, see Delmas, “The Civic Duty to Report Crime and Corruption.” 
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tion thus concerns the subject of whistleblowing, that is, that which is 
being disclosed. Basically, the subject is appropriate—and the moral duty 
to respect the allocation of state power is overridden—when secrecy 
threatens or stains political legitimacy. So, for unlawful leaks of classi-
fied information to be justified, they must be undertaken to remedy sig-
nificant informational deficits and inform the public.  
 The Pentagon Papers justifiably exposed the U.S. commission of war 
crimes in Vietnam, which the government was concealing from the public. 
The first revelation to come out of Manning’s leaks of the Afghanistan and 
Iraq War Logs was the graphic video of a U.S. Apache helicopter airstrike 
of unarmed civilians in Baghdad. “Collateral Murder,” as the video be-
came known as, contributed to changing the way the public viewed the 
war, instilling in particular a healthy dose of skepticism about the govern-
ment’s talk of “surgical strikes.” Manning also leaked 250,000 State De-
partment cables, which revealed prisoner abuse by the Iraqi military and 
routine failures on the part of the U.S. to investigate them. Arguably, Ells-
berg’s and Manning’s disclosures contributed to informing the public de-
bate about serious government misconduct, which stained U.S. legitimacy.  
 The programs and policies kept secret that the public ought to know 
and deliberate about need not involve straightforward wrongdoing or 
illegality. It may simply be the fact of the public’s ignorance that is prob-
lematic and threatens political legitimacy. Another important revelation 
to come out of Manning’s leaks was the count of the civilian and military 
casualties in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The tally of deaths 
was not wrong in and of itself; but the fact that the White House had de-
nied being in its possession was seriously objectionable.  
 In general, the government tends to keep secret those programs whose 
legality is hard to defend, the CIA’s black sites and the NSA’s domestic 
spying program being cases in point. Snowden insisted that the state’s 
efforts to cover the surveillance program under the cloth of legality (via 
the FISA court) did not make the program constitutionally sound. A fed-
eral judge recently agreed with Snowden; and another disagreed, affirm-
ing the program’s legality under the 2001 PATRIOT Act.45 Reasonable 
disagreement about the program’s legality does not weaken Snowden’s 
case for blowing the whistle if what matters is that the public ought to 
have known about the program’s existence, as Snowden stressed in his 
speeches. Snowden’s whistleblowing led to a national debate about civil 
liberties, surveillance, and privacy in the digital age, forcing the Ameri-
can people to think about the existence, nature, and extent of rights that 
may be violated through mass surveillance. Such debate is evidence of 
                                                 
 45See Klayman v. Obama 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (2013), and American Civil Liberties 
Union et al. v. James R. Clapper et al. 13 Civ. 3994 (2014). 
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Snowden’s contribution to democratic deliberation. Hence it may be ar-
gued that Manning’s and Snowden’s whistleblowing satisfied the subject 
condition, and that, in each case, the public’s right to know overrode the 
duty to respect the allocation of power. 
 One may object that the subject condition begs the question of what 
constitutes an illegitimate state secret. The point of the government’s 
interest in secrecy is precisely to give the government discretionary pow-
er over its use of secrecy and the exact scope of state secrets. The interest 
in secrecy thereby preempts individual assessment of the legitimacy and 
merits of the drawing of state secrets, and forecloses the possibility of 
making state secrets the product of collective decision-making. More-
over, through democratic elections, the government is authorized and 
entrusted to make decisions of that sort without public input. All this is to 
say that people ought to trust the government to do its job, and not decide 
on their own what the public ought to know. 
 This objection to the subject condition rightly points to the risk of 
misguided and dangerous government whistleblowing. As a matter of 
course, however, past instances of government whistleblowing have been 
carried out in reaction to significant—quasi-noncontroversial—informa-
tional deficits. According to a recent Frontline documentary, most NSA 
employees who knew about the domestic surveillance program were op-
posed to it and concerned with its illegality, and several NSA employees 
before Snowden attempted to blow the whistle internally.46 Furthermore, 
the risks that come with deluded government whistleblowing, on my ac-
count, are next to null if the next two conditions are properly satisfied.  
 As to the problem of determining the legitimate scope of secrecy 
when that determination is the government’s exclusive domain, one 
should note that the same may be said about the moral duty to obey the 
law, which purports to exclude individual judgment of the merits of the 
law.47 Yet one generally recognizes that people retain, and sometimes 
even ought to exercise, their right to assess the merits of the law when 
they are faced with objectionable legal rules and orders. Similarly with 
the scope of state secrets, a healthy polity, and responsible government 
employees and contractors, should sometimes display vigilance rather 
than blind faith toward the government’s wielding of secrecy.   
 
3.b. The act condition  
 
Second, the acquisition and disclosure of secret information should in 
general be undertaken after lawful attempts to blow the whistle have been 
                                                 
 46See PBS Frontline, “The United States of Secrets,” May 13 and 20, 2014. 
 47See section 2.a on the exclusionary nature of the duty to obey the law. 
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attempted, unless there are reasons to think these would be useless. Ceteris 
paribus, individuals and groups concerned with what the public ignores 
ought to try legal, internal channels of alert before turning to unlawful 
means. The burden of justification of illegal whistleblowing thus weighs 
on the agent. Did Manning and Snowden satisfy the act condition?  
 In 2010, Manning, then an Army intelligence analyst in Iraq, came 
across a report involving Iraqi Federal Police detention, and possible tor-
ture, of 15 people for printing “anti-Iraqi” literature. Manning had the 
literature translated and found that it detailed corruption within the cabi-
net of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s government. She reported 
the incident to her superior who told her to “drop it.” She then tried to 
establish contact with The New York Times but without success, and end-
ed up transmitting the documents to WikiLeaks. The fact that she tried to 
go up the chain of command and failed doesn’t automatically justify the 
leaks, of course; but it may be viewed as indicating a good-faith attempt 
to satisfy the act condition.  
 By making no attempt to go up the chain and fleeing the country, in 
contrast, Snowden’s whistleblowing seems to blatantly violate this se-
cond constraint. Yet the requirement to first attempt lawful ways to bring 
attention to, and halt, some wrongdoing should not be understood as a 
strict requirement to blow the whistle only in last resort. Indeed, the act 
condition is not violated if there are reasons to think that lawful attempts 
would be useless or counterproductive. It is worth keeping in mind that 
four NSA whistleblowers before Snowden had tried to pursue lawful 
means of alert. Thomas Drake had attempted to blow the whistle on the 
NSA’s domestic surveillance program as soon as it was launched. Drake 
followed the protocol set out in the Intelligence Community Whistle-
blower Protection Act by complaining internally to his superiors, the 
NSA Inspector General, and the Defense Department Inspector General, 
and by presenting unclassified documents both to the House and Senate 
Congressional intelligence committees. Four years later, he leaked un-
classified documents to The New York Times. Albeit presenting an ap-
parently clear case of public whistleblowing, Drake was charged under 
the Espionage Act in 2010 (the NSA went on to classify the documents he 
had leaked).48 The other NSA whistleblowers have also been retaliated 
against and harassed by the government, though not as harshly as 
Drake.49 One ought to consider their experiences when evaluating Snow-
                                                 
 48See United States v. Drake, 130 S. Ct. 1562 (2010). The Espionage Act charges 
were dropped just before the trial, and Drake pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge 
under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).  
 49For lengthy interviews with each of them, see Frontline, “The United States of 
Secrets.” 
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den’s decisions: he had solid reasons to think he would be arrested before 
he could warn the public about the U.S. domestic spying. From this per-
spective, Snowden’s leaks and search for asylum may be deemed suita-
bly constrained.   
 
3.c. The minimize harms condition 
 
Government whistleblowing has disruptive and potentially harmful ef-
fects, as we saw in section 2.c. Though these potentials harms, well un-
derstood, do not justify a categorical moral prohibition, they do suggest 
the existence of a duty on the part of the whistleblower to minimize the 
harms that might result from the disclosure. To wit, the agent ought to 
exercise due care when releasing the information. If the information puts 
identifiable, innocent persons at risk (say, it exposes undercover agents), 
then the whistleblower must take precautions against this risk by editing 
names out of the documents before releasing them, and making sure the 
stolen documents do not fall into foreign spies’ hands.  
 The senior Bush administration officials who exposed Valerie Plame 
as a CIA operative blatantly violated the minimize harms condition. 
Their leaks to the press, done in an attempt to discredit Plame’s husband, 
Joe Wilson, whose fact-finding mission in Niger revealed no evidence 
that Saddam Hussein had bought yellowcake, put Plame’s life in danger 
and were morally unjustifiable. One may also argue that WikiLeaks 
failed to exercise sufficient care by “dumping” online the 750,000 un-
edited documents leaked by Manning, as this may have put military per-
sonnel at risk (though they don’t appear to have done so). Arguably,  
special care should be shown in the release of top-secret army infor-
mation when military operations are ongoing. So the manner of leaking 
matters. 
 One way to minimize the harmful effects of government whistleblow-
ing is to collaborate with professional entities such as the press to care-
fully edit the information before its release. Though Snowden could have 
published the documents about the NSA himself, he chose instead to col-
laborate with The Guardian’s Glenn Greenwald, The Washington Post’s 
Barton Gellman, filmmaker Laura Poitras, and the newsroom ProPublica. 
The editor of The Guardian, Alan Rusbridger, recently praised the “care-
ful, responsible journalism” each source demonstrated, observing that “The 
Guardian, The Washington Post, ProPublica, and The New York Times 
have gone to exceptional lengths to edit the Snowden material with cau-
tion.”50 The recipients ensured not only that the information released 
                                                 
 50Alan Rusbridger, “The Snowden Leaks and the Public,” The New York Review of 
Books, 21 November 2013. 
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would not include details that could potentially be used to injure the   
interests of the U.S., but also that the information would enter the public 
domain in the right way, by getting proper coverage and being framed 
adequately. In these ways, the manner of leaking and releasing the NSA 
documents appeared quite exemplary. It is thus reasonable to argue that 
Snowden’s whistleblowing satisfied the minimize harms condition.  
 Should Manning’s release of secret information be deemed suitably 
constrained? Witnesses for the defense at her trial included a former 
chief prosecutor at Guantánamo Bay and an Army security specialist, 
who argued that the leaks did not endanger national security. Manning 
was ultimately acquitted of the charge of “aiding the enemy,” though 
found guilty on 20 other counts. The prosecution argued in closed ses-
sion that the diplomatic cables identified people who had spoken to U.S. 
diplomats in confidence. Not only were these individuals put at risk of 
death, violence, or incarceration in their home country (the number of 
people determined to be at risk was not made public), but the prosecutors 
predicted that the leaks would have a “chilling effect” on human-rights 
activists seeking U.S. State Department help.  
 It is reasonable to argue, on that basis, that the diplomatic cables 
ought to have been sorted out and carefully edited before their release, 
and that Manning and WikiLeaks failed to exercise due care in that re-
spect. Manning’s decision to leak the documents to WikiLeaks, however, 
was well grounded, since WikiLeaks had been blowing the whistle on 
various human rights abuses at Guantánamo (it had released a copy 
of Standard Operating Procedures for Camp Delta in 2007). All in all, 
Manning’s failure to minimize the harms that could follow the release of 
information may be deemed to stain the moral justification of her actions 
without necessarily undermining it, given the great benefits to public de-
liberation they brought about. 
 
 
4. 
 
I have argued that government whistleblowing may be justified when it 
satisfies three conditions: (A) it exposes serious government wrongdoing 
or programs and policies that ought to be known and deliberated about; 
(B) it is undertaken after lawful attempts to make the information public 
have been attempted, unless there are reasons to think these would be 
useless; and (C) the whistleblower exercises due care in the disclosure so 
as to minimize the harms that could potentially ensue, including carefully 
choosing the leaks’ recipients. Constrained in these ways, government 
whistleblowing, or political vigilantism, still constitutes an interference 
with the state’s allocation of power—but it can sometimes be a morally 
102 Candice Delmas 
 
 
  
justified one. Government whistleblowing contributes to political delib-
eration, and exposes the government’s lapses of legitimacy. Until such 
failures no longer occur, government whistleblowing will remain an im-
perfect but critical way of exposing illegal or morally reprehensible gov-
ernment practices.  
 The foregoing account suggests that because whistleblowers trans-
gress the boundaries around state secrets for the purpose of alerting the 
collectivity to some illegitimate allocation or use of power, government 
whistleblowing is compatible with respect for democratic authority. John 
Rawls writes that one who engages in civil disobedience “addresses the 
sense of justice of the majority of the community and declares that in 
one’s considered opinion the principles of social cooperation among free 
and equal men are not being respected.”51 The civilly disobedient agent 
points out significant deviations from justice and tries to persuade the 
majority of the need for reform. Civil disobedience thus “serves to inhibit 
departures from justice and to correct them when they occur” and “helps 
to maintain and strengthen just institutions.”52 It promotes justice by pro-
posing to rectify injustices.  
 We should think about government whistleblowing in similar ways, 
as a potentially useful democratic device to inhibit government wrongdo-
ing and enhance political legitimacy. Philosophers have long studied the 
democracy-enhancing function of civil disobedience, but they have ne-
glected government whistleblowing. Journalists, on the other hand, know 
the significance of government whistleblowing in informing public de-
bates. Laurie Oakes, for instance, writes that “leaks, and whistleblowers, 
are essential to a proper democratic system.”53 Government whistleblow-
ers promote legitimacy by remedying serious informational deficits re-
garding government wrongdoing or policies objectionably shrouded in 
secrecy. They act as “cognitive enhancers” and “debate boosters,” aug-
menting people’s knowledge of their government’s actions and invigorat-
ing public discussion.  
 One might welcome the parallel between civil disobedience and   
government whistleblowing but stress that the conditions I have laid out 
neglect the necessity of civility, which accounts of civil disobedience 
generally emphasize. Martin Luther King, Jr., for instance, distinguished 
between Civil Rights activists’ and segregationists’ legal disobedience by 
observing that the former, unlike the latter, disobeyed the law “openly, 
                                                 
 51John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1999 [1971]), p. 320. 
 52Ibid., p. 336. 
 53Laurie Oakes, “Pillars of Democracy Depend on Leaks,” The Bulletin, 24 August 
2005. 
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lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty.”54 Similarly, 
Rawls claimed that for disobedience to be civil, it must be nonviolent, 
open, and public, and the agent must recognize the legitimacy of the state 
and be willing to accept the punishment.55  
 By publicizing in advance one’s intention to protest, submitting to 
arrest, and willingly accepting the penalty for violating the law, as pub-
licity and openness require, civil disobedients demonstrate their sincere 
commitment to the cause and operate “within the limits of fidelity to 
law.”56 These features mark the act’s civility, which is crucial to its com-
municative function (i.e., its transparency as an address to the communi-
ty) and its conception as a form of political participation.57 Since the in-
stances of government whistleblowing I have discussed lack such marks 
of civility—Snowden did not warn the authorities of his intention to leak 
classified documents, for instance; and he blew the whistle from outside 
the U.S. so as to escape punishment—they cannot be justified, let alone 
be compatible with democratic authority.  
 A number of theorists have refuted the Rawlsian view that these marks 
of civility—nonviolence, openness, publicity, recognition of state legiti-
macy, and willingness to accept punishment—are necessary for the defi-
nition or justification of civil disobedience.58 For instance, Brian Smart 
notes that advance warning to the authorities can sometimes guarantee an 
arrest and preclude the undertaking of the civilly disobedient act.59 David 
Lyons observes that the requirement that the agent recognize the state’s 
overall legitimacy is historically implausible in the case of Henry David 
Thoreau, Mohandas Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. (whom theo-
rists view as paragons of civil disobedience), and morally untenable in 
the face of chattel slavery, British colonial rule in India, and Jim Crow.60 
Brownlee objects to the requirement that the agent be willing to accept 
                                                 
 54Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” in Hugo Adam Bedau 
(ed.), Civil Disobedience in Focus (New York: Routledge, 1991), chap. 4, p. 74.  
 55Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 320. Rawls even makes it a defining feature of civil 
disobedience. I shall merely treat it as a necessary condition for the justification of civil 
disobedience here. 
 56Ibid. 
 57See, e.g., William Smith, Civil Disobedience and Deliberative Democracy (New 
York: Routledge, 2013). 
 58For an overview of these critiques, see Kimberley Brownlee, “Civil Disobedience,” 
in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition); 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/civil-disobedience/. 
 59In his view, all that is needed is a declaration of intention made after the fact. See 
Brian Smart, “Defining Civil Disobedience,” in Bedau (ed.), Civil Disobedience in Fo-
cus, chap. 12, p. 206. 
 60David Lyons, “Moral Judgment, Historical Reality, and Civil Disobedience,” Phi-
losophy & Public Affairs 27 (1998): 31-49. 
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punishment that if an act of civil disobedience is a morally justified exer-
cise of the right to engage in civil disobedience, then it ought not to be 
punished.61 She further rebuts the standard assumption that all violence 
necessarily obscures the communicative quality of the disobedient act.62 
In short, though the features of civility may well be desirable, they 
should not be deemed necessary to justify civil disobedience.  
 Neither are they necessary to justify government whistleblowing. It 
does not matter whether the agent accepts or denies the state’s overall 
legitimacy so long as her disclosure remedies a significant informational 
deficit (which, at a minimum, constitutes a stain on political legitimacy) 
and is suitably constrained. The agent’s willingness to accept punishment 
has symbolic significance, as it demonstrates her sincere commitment to 
the cause, and can play an important strategic role, by ensuring, or in-
creasing the chances, that people see the illegal act as a public address to 
the community. But government whistleblowing, unlike certain other 
forms of illegal protest, already presents itself as a public address, since 
to blow the whistle is to alert the authorities or the public. Moreover, 
other things can demonstrate the agent’s sincere commitment besides her 
willingness to accept punishment, such as Snowden’s self-sacrifice as he 
condemned himself to a life in exile or in prison. Whistleblowers in gen-
eral have more to lose than to gain from their whistleblowing—even 
when they are legally protected.63 
 Though the cases of government whistleblowing I considered were not 
anonymous, I would like to end by briefly examining whether anony-
mous whistleblowing might be morally justified. There are many instances 
of anonymous government whistleblowing in the history of the U.S. The 
members of the Citizens Commission to Investigate the FBI, who broke 
into an FBI office and stole files that revealed the FBI’s elaborate program 
of spying on dissident groups (known as COINTELPRO), concealed 
their identity for 40 years. “Deep Throat,” the FBI agent who leaked in-
formation to the Washington Post about the Watergate scandal, remained 
anonymous for over 30 years. Anonymity violates the openness and pub-
licity requirements, on most accounts of civil disobedience. Anonymity 
                                                 
 61Kimberley Brownlee, “Penalizing Public Disobedience,” Ethics 118 (2008): 711-16. 
 62Kimberley Brownlee, “Features of a Paradigm Case of Civil Disobedience,” Res 
Publica 10 (2004): 337-51, pp. 349-50. 
 63On the costs of whistleblowing, see, e.g.: Myron P. Glazer and Penina M. Glazer, 
The Whistleblowers: Exposing Corruption in Government and Industry (New York: 
Basic Books, 1989), p. 7; Joyce Rothschild and Terance D. Miethe, “Whistle-Blower 
Disclosures and Management Retaliation,” Work and Occupations 6 (1999): 107-28; 
Alan F. Westin, Whistle Blowing! Loyalty and Dissent in the Corporation (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1981); and C. Fred Alford, Whistleblowers, Broken Lives and Organiza-
tional Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).  
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is seen as counterproductive and self-defeating when it comes to address-
ing the community, because it arouses suspicions as to the true motives 
of the agent and obfuscates the message.  
 Does the same apply to government whistleblowing? The answer is 
“no.” Anonymous government whistleblowing is morally justifiable, in 
my view, because of the enormous prudential costs whistleblowers face 
(including the probability of retaliation, loss of career, risk of lengthy 
punishment, and externalities such as impact on the family).64 The jour-
nalists with whom Snowden collaborated advised him to remain an 
anonymous source; his blowing the whistle anonymously would have 
been morally justified in the circumstances, especially judging from what 
happened to the previous NSA whistleblowers.  
 
Let me conclude with some implications of the foregoing account on the 
proper treatment of government whistleblowers by democratic societies. 
First, internal channels of grievances should be made much more respon-
sive and efficient so as to diminish whistleblowers’ resort to illegal leaks. 
Second, legislation should be enacted to protect workers and contractors 
in areas where protections are currently weak or lacking (such as intelli-
gence work). Third, governments’ prosecution of whistleblowers as trai-
tors and spies is disproportionate and unjust. Neither the Espionage Act, 
nor the Organized Crime Control Act (aka RICO, which has recently 
been updated to prosecute hackers), nor the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act (on the basis of which Manning and Drake were sentenced) consti-
tute appropriate frameworks to deal with government whistleblowers, 
who are not ordinary criminals, but morally motivated, civic-minded 
law-breakers. Fourth, something like a “public’s right to know” defense 
should be available in court for government whistleblowers who broke 
the law, so as to give them a chance to justify their actions; and guide-
lines for leniency in sentencing should be provided. The protections cur-
rently afforded conscientious objectors could further provide the legal 
basis for extending some of the same protections to whistleblowers.65  
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 64Other theorists have defended the moral permissibility of anonymous whistleblow-
ing. See, e.g.: James Rocha and Edward Song, “Pre-Emptive Anonymous Whistleblow-
ing,” Public Affairs Quarterly 26 (2012): 257-71; and Frederick Elliston, “Anonymity 
and Whistleblowing,” Journal of Business Ethics 1 (1982): 167-77.  
 65I am grateful to Sean Aas, Chris Grau, faculty and students at Wellesley College 
and Georgia State University, and two anonymous reviewers for Social Theory and Prac-
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